Health Affairs, 27, no. 1 (2008): 88 doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.27.1.88 © 2008 by Project HOPE	New Online   New Issue: China & India   Obesity In China   Pay Cuts For Medicare Docs   Access To Care Woes

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Benefit Design

PROLOGUE

Improving The Design Of Health Insurance Benefits

Nothing is more central to health economics than the principle that health insurance coverage increases the use of health services or, alternatively stated, that we spend other people’s money more easily than we do our own. To this "moral hazard" has been attributed much of the growth in health care costs, and many economists have proposed to dampen inflation by reducing insurance coverage and increasing the patient’s share through copayments and deductibles. Needless to say, this economic focus on moral hazard and "overinsurance" does not fit well with many noneconomists’ focus on access to care and "underinsurance." The empirical literature . . . [Full Text of this Article]

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