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TRENDSMedicare Home Health Before And After The BBA
After several years of dramatic growth in Medicare spending for home health care, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 made several changes to control spending, provide incentives for agencies to deliver care more efficiently, and rein in use of the home health benefit to deliver long-term personal care. The BBA made modifications to eligibility and coverage rules, but its most important change was to legislate the development of a prospective payment system (PPS) for home health reimbursement. While that development was under way, it called for the establishment of an interim payment system (IPS). After passage of the BBA, several policy analysts described problems that could occur for the sickest and most frail patients, but only a few limited impact studies have been done.1 These studies focus on access issues using surveys of agencies, discharge planners and other key informants, and analyses of Medicare provider and claims data. Their findings indicate that a substantial number of agencies closed, utilization fell, and the marketplace changed greatlybut it is unclear if access to care has been adversely affected.2 This paper presents data on use of and payments for Medicare home health services from a nationally representative sample of beneficiaries, comparing the period before the BBA with the first two years after its implementation. implementation. It is the first part of a broader project examining how the BBA has affected Medicare beneficiaries, home health agencies, and the health care system.
Between 1988 and 1996Medicare spending on home health increased an average of 31 percent per year, with dramatic increases in both the number of users and the amount of use.3 From 1988 to 1996 the number of beneficiaries receiving home health services rose 225 percent, from 1.6 to 3.6 million; annual visits per user increased 343 percent, from twenty-three to seventy-nine. Yearly payments per user increased 374 percent, from $1,287 in 1988 to $4,819 in 1996, an inflation-adjusted average yearly increase of 14.4 percent.4 A number of factors led to this acceleration. The loosening of eligibility and coverage criteria in 1989 as a result of a class-action lawsuit had a substantial effect.5 The inpatient hospital PPS, medical technology changes, and patient preference also likely contributed.6 Additionally, the agency reimbursement system encouraged agencies to provide more services, with little consideration of cost. It reimbursed the home health agencies their actual costs up to an annual limit, based on a national per visit amount for each type of visit multiplied by the agencys number of visits of each type.7 Thus, an agency could increase Medicare net income simply by providing more visits while keeping its average costs per visit below the national limits.8 The BBA addressed these concerns by changing home health eligibility and coverage rules and reforming the payment methodology. In addition, even before the BBA, several federal agencies were acting to ensure that beneficiaries and services met Medicare requirements. We discuss these three areas of change below.
Eligibility and coverage. Eligibility for Medicare home health is limited to beneficiaries who are "homebound," need "intermittent" skilled nursing or therapy services, and are under the care of a physician who prescribes their plan of care. A beneficiary needing only personal care does not qualify. Once a beneficiary is deemed eligible, Medicare pays for unlimited visits for "part-time or intermittent" care from any of the six home health service disciplines (see Note 7), with no copayment or deductible. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reports in 1996 and 1998 indicated wide variation in the interpretation of the terms "intermittent," "part-time or intermittent," and "homebound."9 The BBA clarified the definition of "intermittent" for eligibility, specified the limits of "part-time or intermittent" care, and called for a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) study of the criteria to determine if a beneficiary is "homebound."10 In addition, venipuncture (or blood drawing) was excluded as a basis for qualifying for home health services if it was the sole skilled service that the beneficiary required. Reimbursement. Under the BBA, HCFA was required to put in place a home health PPS and, while that was in process, institute an IPS. The IPS was phased in beginning October 1997 with the start of each agencys cost reporting period. The IPS constrained agency reimbursement not only by reducing the per visit limitations but also by adding a per beneficiary limit.11 Regional home health intermediaries calculated the agency-specific limitations and determined interim claims payments. Compliance initiatives. Several other activities occurring just before and after the passage of BBA may have slowed the growth of home health spending. In 1995 HCFA, the Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Administration on Aging jointly implemented Operation Restore Trust (ORT) to identify fraud and abuse in home health agencies, nursing homes, and medical equipment suppliers. Initially begun in five states, it had expanded to eighteen states by 1998. ORT includes audits, criminal investigations, surveys, inspections, and hotlines. In addition to authorizing grants to expand ORT, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 imposed civil monetary penalties on physicians who knowingly certified ineligible patients for Medicare home health.12 In September 1997 HCFA implemented a six-month moratorium on the certification of new home health agencies and increased cost report audits and medical reviews of claims. A sequential billing requirement was imposed in June 1998 whereby claims for a beneficiary would only be paid "in sequence," so that if a claim were under review, no subsequent claims for that beneficiary would be paid. This requirement was removed in July 1999 because it was creating a backlog of claims and cash-flow problems for agencies. In January 1999 the OIG issued a Special Fraud Alert to physicians concerning their criminal and civil liability for intentionally signing a false or misleading certification of medical necessity for home health.
This study combines HCFA claims data from the 1 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries with information from HCFA eligibility files. The study population consists of Medicare Part A fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries who reside in one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia. All home health users and a random sample of nonusers are included in the database. A home health user is defined as any person who received at least one home health visit during the applicable time period. Observations are weighted by the proportion of the year the beneficiary was eligible, and users and nonusers are weighted up to their proportions in the total Medicare FFS population. The number of "visits" is the total number of units of services recorded in home health claims for any of the six home health disciplines. Home health "payments" are the sums of all the "paid dollar" fields in the claims for the six disciplines. These amounts are the interim payments made by the intermediaries to the agencies; they do not reflect final reconciliations that may take place because of agency cost settlements that occur at least two years after the service dates.13
Use of Medicare home health services fell dramatically after the BBA. Exhibit 1
From FY 1997 to FY 1999 total Medicare payments for home health visits for FFS beneficiaries decreased by more than half. The drop reflects a slight decline in the Medicare FFS population; payments per enrollee declined by 50 percent over this period. Home health users per 1,000 beneficiaries decreased 21 percent. Consistent with a 41 percent drop in the number of visits per user, the yearly payments per user decreased 37 percent.
Home health care use was relatively stable for the quarters prior to the BBA, from Quarter 1 of 1996 through Quarter 3 of 1997 (Exhibit 2
Service mix. The drop in home health use was accompanied by a shift in the mix of visit types. By the end of 1999 about a third of home health visits were aide visits, compared with almost half before the BBA (Exhibit 3
Episode length. Consistent with the drop in visits, home health episodes shortened after the BBA (Exhibit 4
Population subgroups. Both the incidence and amount of use among users was highest in FY 1997 for beneficiaries with state Medicaid buy-in, those over age seventy-five, females, nonwhites, and those in rural areas (Exhibit 5
Among home health users, there were significantly greater-than-average decreases in the number of visits for females (43 percent) and for those age eighty-five and older (45 percent), compared with a 41 percent average decrease. Beneficiaries under age sixty-five had a significantly smaller-than-average decrease of 33 percent. Those age eighty-five and older and nonwhites had a 41 percent decrease in their payments, with an average decrease of 37 percent.
Census region.
Census region was related to substantial differences in utilization patterns both before and after the BBA (Exhibit 5 The drop in the rate of home health use varied from 7 percent in the Middle Atlantic region to 32 percent in the East South Central region. New England, which had one of the highest rates of use before the BBA, had the second-lowest reduction (15 percent). The decrease in visits per user ranged from 31 percent (Middle Atlantic) to 48 percent (Mountain). The regions with the smallest number of visits per user before the BBA generally decreased less, although the Pacific region, which had the lowest number of visits among users in FY 1997, had a 39 percent decrease, just below the average decrease.
Diagnoses.
Larger-than-average decreases in visits and payments per user are found for several diseases of the circulatory system: cardiac disrythmias, cerebrovascular disease, and hypertensive disease (Exhibit 6
Although HCFA has released aggregate data on changes in home health visits and payments after BBA implementation, this is the first look at home health use analyzed per person. The data presented here indicate the relative stability of the rates of use and payments for the eighteen months before implementation of the IPS, the dramatic decreases that began during the IPS phase-in, and the continued reductions observed in the first fifteen months during which all home health agencies were under the IPS. These trends reflect reactions to the new reimbursement policies specified by the IPS (and possibly anticipation of the upcoming PPS) and changes in eligibility and coverage, as well as the intensification of federal compliance efforts. The proportion of beneficiaries using home health services dropped by more than one fifth after the BBA. To the extent that this reduction occurred as the result of the eligibility and coverage changes of the BBA and other eligibility tightening and fraud-and-abuse prevention activities, the nonusers will continue to be nonusers under the PPS. However, to the extent that the changes were the result of agencies reacting to IPS incentives to avoid higher -cost beneficiaries, which may be reduced under the PPSs case-mix adjustment system, some nonusers may reappear as users. User rates fell most for beneficiaries in rural areas and those with state Medicaid buy-in. Aggressive Medicare maximization by some state Medicaid programs might have inflated the rates of home health use prior to the BBA, which were two-thirds more than those for Medicare eligibles not receiving Medicaid.15 The above-average decrease for rural beneficiaries may reflect the increased closure of agencies in rural areas compared with urban areas. However, this finding is not consistent with the GAOs earlier analysis, which found that agency closures in rural areas resulted in only slight decreases in the proportion of beneficiaries served.16 Medicare resources spent on those who used home health services after IPS implementation were also much less, with only approximately $3 of every $5 spent before the BBA still being spent on users in the year after IPS implementation. This reduction, which was greater than projected when the BBA was enacted, reflects both the tighter federal enforcement efforts to ensure that services are physician approved and reasonable and necessary, and the financial incentives of the IPS.17 The observed effect may be smaller under the PPS as the new payment incentives will no longer restrict visit payments or yearly costs per beneficiary and thus could result both in a lengthening of episodes (that is, beyond the first sixty days) and a reduction in the number of visits provided within each sixty-day payment period. The strong decreases in use were most dramatic for aide visits and less so for skilled nursing services, and an increase in use was observed in the number of therapy visits. This increase reflects differences in treatment patterns that might result in changes and even improvements in the quality of care, although conclusions about this would require an evaluation that explicitly examines the quality of care delivered. Although visits and payments per home health user declined among all of the subpopulations examined, the drop was relatively greater for beneficiaries age eighty-five and older, who are more likely than younger beneficiaries are to need personal care services because of their higher incidence incidence of chronic disabilities or conditions.18 These findings seem consistent with the widely recognized intention of the BBA to reduce use of the Medicare benefit to provide personal care services. Whether this will result in lowered quality of care, increased incidence of adverse effects, or less satisfaction with the provision of home care under the Medicare program is an important topic for future study. The PPS that went into effect in October 2000 provides yet another set of financial incentives for agencies. The experience reported here indicates that agencies will take them seriously. The PPS provides a case-mix-adjusted capitated payment for a sixty-day episode of care. An unlimited number of episodes authorized by a supervising physician are permitted. Thus, agencies will no longer have incentives to avoid long-stay patients, although incentives will continue to avoid high-cost short-stay patients receiving care for fewer than sixty days. In the BBA of 1997 Congress legislated a mandate for reforming Medicare payments for its postacute and chronic long-term care services. Home health, one of Medicares most popular services, has been dramatically affected. Home health expenditures have decreased sharply in the two years since its passage. The extent to which home health eligibility clarification, fraud-and-abuse enforcement, and the payment scheme have changed service-use patterns and how these patterns continue into PPS implementation are important to continue to monitor. The demographic imperatives of the next fifty years will increase demand for chronic care services and promote the development of a fuller range of clinical, medical, and social support services. Home health will likely be an important component of the services desired. How we organize and pay for this continuum of services in a way that ensures access while promising efficient use of resources is the true future challenge for our country.
Nelda McCall is president of Laguna Research Associates in San Francisco. Harriet Komisar is assistant professor, Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown University, in Washington, D.C. Andrew Petersons is a research analyst and Stanley Moore is a senior programmer at Laguna. This paper is based on work funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) through the Home Care Research Initiative at the Center for Home Care Policy and Research of the Visiting Nurse Service of New York; the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) under Contract no. HCFA-00-0108; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) under Contract no. HHS-100-99- 0021. The analysis and conclusions are solely those of the authors and do not express any official opinion of or endorsement by the funders. The authors thank the following persons who commented on an earlier version of this paper: James Knickman of the RWJF; Penny Feldman and Christopher Murtaugh of the Center for Home Care Policy and Research; Sydney Galloway, Ann Meadow, and Phillip Cotterill of HCFA; Kamal Hijjazi of ASPE; and Joseph Hafkenschiel of the California Association for Health Services at Home.
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