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Youth Targeting By Tobacco Manufacturers Since The Master Settlement Agreement
The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between tobacco manufacturers and forty-six states bans manufacturers from targeting minors through advertising. To determine how youth targeting in magazine cigarette advertisements changed after the MSA, we analyzed magazine readership and cigarette ads in U.S. magazines from 1997 to 2000. In 2000 all three major manufacturers (Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and Brown and Williamson) failed to comply with the MSAs youth-targeting ban, selectively increasing their youth targeting. Banning all magazine advertising of cigarettes may be necessary to eliminate youth targeting in magazines.
Most smokers begin smoking before age eighteen, and the likelihood of smoking onset drops rapidly thereafter.1 Tobacco industry documents describe an acute awareness that capturing this underage market is essential to long-term success.2 Cigarette advertising has been shown both to attract adolescents to smoking and to establish smoking as a social norm.3 Attempts to curb adolescent exposure to cigarette advertising began in 1969 with the banning of television and radio ads.4 In recent years the proportion of high school students who smoked rose from 27.5 percent in 1991 to a peak of 36.4 percent in 1997 before drifting back to 28.0 percent in 2000.5 The alarming increase in the first half of the decade was among the factors that prompted a reexamination of regulatory policy, culminating in the November 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).6 The MSA, signed by tobacco manufacturers and forty-six states attorneys general, prohibits tobacco manufacturers from taking "any action, directly or indirectly, to target Youth within any Settling State in the advertising, promotion or marketing of Tobacco Products."7 As a blanket youth-targeting ban, this provision applies to all types of advertising, including transit ads, billboards, and magazines. Whereas transit ads and billboards were explicitly and completely banned in the MSA subprovisions, application of the youth-targeting ban to magazines was not clearly specified. With respect to magazines, most researchers have attempted to evaluate compliance with the MSA by appropriating a 1996 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) definition of "youth magazine." The FDA divides magazines into two types, youth and adult. Youth magazines are those having either more than two million youth readers (under age eighteen) or more than 15 percent youth readership.8 Using this FDA definition, a prior study found that both total and youth-oriented tobacco advertising expenditures had increased in 1999 after the MSA.9 A second study, also using the FDA youth magazine definition, found that expenditures in adult and youth magazines in 2000 were not remarkably different from expenditures prior to the MSA.10 While these studies did show that tobacco ads continued to reach large numbers of youth, they could not determine if tobacco companies were actually violating the MSA youth-targeting ban. Simply measuring changes in the number of ads or expenditures does not measure targeting. For example, a tobacco companys resources may fluctuate from year to year, thus changing the number of ads it can place or how much it can spend, for reasons unrelated to youth targeting. Targeting occurs only when the average distribution of ads or expenditures favors magazines with more youth readers. In other words, a manufacturer engages in youth targeting when it is more likely to advertise in a magazine with more youth readers than in a magazine with fewer youth readers. We created a model that identified changes in youth targeting by tobacco manufacturers over time, looking specifically at how the ratio of ads placed at different youth readership levels shifted from 1997 through 2000. For this analysis we gave wide latitude to the tobacco industry, accepting at face value the claim that youth targeting did not occur prior to the MSA. If that were the case, then any subsequent increase in the propensity to advertise in magazines based on youth readership would represent new-onset youth targeting and would violate the MSA.
Data sources. We obtained magazine readership data from Mediamark Research Incorporated (MRI).11 MRIs database is an advertising industry standard and is used by tobacco manufacturers in their own advertising research.12 MRI tracks both youth (ages 1217) and adult readers in forty-eight of the most widely read magazines in its data set.13 We abstracted readership data for these magazines from MRIs fall 1999 report.
Ad placement and spending data were obtained from Competitive Media Reporting (CMR).14 CMR compiles all ad placement units and estimates expenditures for all members of the Publishers Information Bureau. Ad placement units correspond roughly to the number of ad pages. For simplicity, we refer to ad placement units as "ads." We abstracted ad and spending data by cigarette brand for the forty-eight magazines in our data set, tracking each year from 1997 through 2000. Of the forty-eight magazines, twelve either did not accept cigarette ads by policy or were not completely tracked by CMR, leaving thirty-six magazines in the final data set (Exhibit 1
Statistical analysis. We analyzed the number of ads placed by each manufacturer in each magazine in each full year from 1997 through 2000. The last full year before the MSA, 1997, was used as a baseline for each manufacturers advertising. Advertising in each subsequent year was then compared with this baseline. We examined how the ratio of ads placed at differing youth readership levels shifted over time. The model accounted for all magazine-level factors that might also influence ad placement, such as total adult, young adult, female, and minority readerships. The details of the models are beyond the scope of this discussion.15 Instead, we provide a hypothetical example demonstrating the application of a simplified version of our model. Two hypothetical magazines, Magazine A and Magazine B, differ in their number of youth readers. Magazine A has a youth readership of 2.2 million, while Magazine B has only 1.7 million. In 1997 a tobacco company placed fifty ads in Magazine A and thirty ads in Magazine B. In 2000 Magazine A received forty ads and Magazine B, twenty ads. Looking only at the total number of ads or using just the FDAs youth magazine definition, we might call this change an improvement. Not only has the total number of ads decreased by twenty, but also the number of ads in magazines with more than two million youth readers has decreased by ten. But measuring a change in the number of ads does not by itself measure a change in targeting. As stated earlier, targeting occurs only when the average distribution of ads or expenditures favors the magazines with more youth readers. In other words, targeting is measured by calculating a proportion, the ratio of ads placed in a given magazine over ads placed in another magazine with fewer youth readers. To examine the change in targeting, we follow this proportion over time. In our example, we divide the number of ads in Magazine A by the number of ads in Magazine B in each year, and then compare each years ratios. In our hypothetical example, the ratio of ads between Magazine A and Magazine B in 1997 was 50/30, or 1.67. In 2000 the ratio of ads was 40/20, or 2.00. Comparing the two ratios, we find that the ratio in 2000 (2.00) was 20 percent greater than the ratio in 1997 (1.67). The tobacco company, given two magazines that differ by 0.5 million youth readers, was 20 percent more likely to advertise in the magazine with higher youth readership (Magazine A) in 2000 than it was in 1997. In other words, targeting increased by 20 percent in this population of two magazines differing by 0.5 million youth readers. This simplified example looks at a population of only two magazines. Our actual model examined all possible two-magazine combinations in our thirty-six-magazine sample and accounted for the previously described magazine-level factors that might also affect ad placement.
From 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2000, an estimated $1.01 billion was spent to place 12,000 cigarette ads in the thirty-six magazines in our sample. The expenditures represented approximately three-quarters of the total cigarette advertising dollars spent by tobacco companies in all U.S. magazines during this time period.16 Together, the top three manufacturers (Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and Brown and Williamson) accounted for 96 percent of the expenditures in our sample and 86 percent of the ads. Therefore, we focused our analyses on these three manufacturers.
Since the FDA youth magazine definition had been widely publicized, it was likely that tobacco companies had adopted different advertising strategies for magazines above and below the FDA threshold. Therefore, it was important to determine which magazines met the FDA youth magazine criteria. Eighteen magazines had more than 15 percent of their readership in the group ages 1217, while nine had more than two million readers in that age group (Exhibit 1 For the tobacco industry as a whole, cigarette ad spending increased by $1.6 million per magazine per year (26 percent) after the MSA. Spending increased both above and below the FDA threshold for all manufacturers. In contrast, the number of cigarette ads in our sample dropped by 26 percent after the MSA. The decrease was similar above and below the FDA threshold.
Exhibit 2
Next, we analyzed advertising behavior in those magazines with more than two million youth readers. Within this group of magazines, for every 0.5 million youth reader difference between any two magazines, R.J. Reynolds was 31 percent less likely in 2000 to advertise in the magazine with higher youth readership than it was in 1997. In other words, R.J. Reynolds youth targeting decreased by 31 percent per 0.5 million youth reader difference between any two magazines with more than two million youth readers. Neither Brown and Williamson nor Philip Morris showed statistically significant changes in these magazines in 2000.
Using the alternative FDA definition, we conducted a separate analysis looking at magazines with less than 15 percent youth readership (Exhibit 3
When analyzing magazines with more than 15 percent youth readership, we found that Philip Morris showed a 28 percent decrease in youth targeting from 1997 to 2000. Neither R.J. Reynolds nor Brown and Williamson showed statistically significant changes in targeting in 2000 when the magazines were analyzed by percentage youth readership.
Despite an explicit ban in the November 1998 MSA, youth targeting through cigarette ads increased in 2000 for all three major manufacturers in magazines with youth readerships below the FDA threshold. This study is the first to document violations of the MSA youth-targeting ban. We contend that the MSAs failure to operationalize the ban with respect to magazines may have made these violations possible. At first glance, the industrywide decrease in cigarette ads in magazines with more than 15 percent youth readership or more than two million youth readers is encouraging. However, we show that this decrease occurred simultaneously with a general decrease in all cigarette ads. Furthermore, this decrease in ads occurred in the setting of a consistent increase in ad expenditures. Therefore, the decrease in ads may have been driven by a marked increase in cost per ad rather than a good-faith effort by manufacturers to decrease youth exposure to advertising. When the FDA created its youth magazine definition in 1996, it established a guideline that resonated with the public. In response, both Philip Morris and Brown and Williamson publicly committed to adopting the FDA definition by 2001.17 However, we have shown this definition to be fundamentally incompatible with the legal language of the 1998 MSA youth-targeting ban. Whereas the MSA explicitly bans all youth targeting, the FDA definition implicitly encourages it among magazines with fewer than two million youth readers or less than 15 percent youth readership. For instance, intentionally placing more ads in magazines with 1.5 million youth readers than in magazines with 1.0 million youth readers is clearly youth targeting and is banned by the MSA. However, the widespread popularity of the arbitrary FDA youth magazine definition created an opportunity for tobacco advertisers to exploit youth readership differences below two million or 15 percent. In fact, it is entirely possible for a manufacturer to simultaneously violate the MSA and adopt the FDA definition. One way would be to increase youth targeting below the FDA threshold, while decreasing youth targeting above it.
It appears that such a scenario may have occurred. A recent study showed that overall youth exposure to ads did not change after the MSA, which supports our hypothesis that increased selective targeting is able to compensate for any decreased targeting above the FDA threshold.18 In our study we find that between 1997 and 2000 both Brown and Williamson and R.J. Reynolds increasingly targeted magazines with youth readership just under the limit of two million youth readers (Exhibit 2 Our study has limitations. First, we were able to collect complete data for only thirty-six magazines. Although we cannot determine just how well these magazines reflect all magazines, they do attract the large majority of cigarette ad expenditures, and their readership characteristics do accurately reflect the demography of magazine readers in the United States. Second, 2000 may have been another transitional year as manufacturers attempted to change their advertising strategies. Follow-up analysis in the near future would increase our understanding of trends. Third, we assess changes in youth targeting relative to 1997. Since 1997 ended almost a full year before the MSA, we assumed that advertising in that year reflected a stable baseline pattern of ad placement. For reasons that we may not have considered, 1997 could have been an anomalous year. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that our method accepted at face value the tobacco industrys claim that no targeting was occurring at baseline in 1997. Even so, we were able to find strong evidence of subsequent, new violations of the MSA youth targeting ban. We have developed a new method to evaluate tobacco manufacturers compliance with the targeting ban with respect to magazines. We have determined that youth targeting has not just persisted but has selectively increased. Tobacco companies have violated the terms of their settlement agreement and continue to expose youth to their magazine ads virtually unchecked. We contend that achieving significant reductions in youth exposure to tobacco advertising may require the absolute ban in magazines that already exists in television, radio, transit space, and billboards.
Paul Chung and Craig Garfield are Robert Wood Johnson clinical scholars in the Departments of Pediatrics and Medicine at the University of Chicago; John Lantos is an associate professor in those departments. Paul Rathouz and Diane Lauderdale are assistant professors in that universitys Department of Health Studies. Dana Best is an assistant professor, General Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, at the Childrens National Medical Center in Washington, D.C. Chung and Garfield are joint lead authors of this paper. The authors thank the Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholars Program for its financial support of this study.
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