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Vouchers For FDA Priority ReviewsDavid Ridley and colleagues (Mar/Apr 06) deserve praise for seeking market-based mechanisms to encourage the development of medicines and vaccines for diseases primarily affecting the poorest nations, but their prescriptiona transferable voucher for priority review by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)is built on faulty assumptions. They come to the value of an FDA priority review on the basis of an estimate that a standard review takes 18.4 months and a priority review takes 6.4 months. According to the FDA, in fiscal year 2003 the actual times for standard reviews were 13.8 months and 6.4 months, respectively. More important, under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), the FDA has committed to delivering action on 90 percent of applications for standard reviews within ten months and for priority reviews within six months. A better estimate of time saved, then, is four to seven months, which would change the papers estimate of the value of the proposed incentive. In addition, the proposal depends on the FDAs doing priority reviews for drugs and vaccines that it otherwise would not deem as meriting the required resources. Although the authors propose requiring drug companies to pay an additional user fee for this, it is not obvious that the fees would be enough to ensure that the FDA would have the expert human resources to do so without taking away from reviewing medicines and vaccines that it believes need priority review. Market mechanisms are the key to creating incentives for drug companies to increase research and development (R&D) commitments to meet the needs of the developing world. Strong advance purchase commitment (APC) proposals, which are advancing rapidly, are the most direct way to create these incentives.
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