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Clarifying The Employer Tax ExclusionIn an otherwise very informative paper on the use of tax policy to achieve health policy objectives, Jason Furman (May/June 08) asserts that eliminating the employer exclusion "would cause a large number of employers, especially smaller employers, to drop coverage." The total elimination of tax subsidies for employer coverage might indeed cause some employers to drop coverage, but a simple tax cap of the type that was proposed by the Reagan administration (1984) and by the Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) is not one of them. Lumping these quite different tax policy proposals together sends a misleading message about the effects of a tax cap. If a limit were placed on the cost of employer coverage that could be excluded from an employees taxable income, firms that now offer health insurance would have strong incentives to offer policies that allowed employees to avoid additional taxes. Firms that offered employees a choice of policies could offer at least one that stayed below the cap. Firms that offered only one plan could redesign it to make sure no worker faced an additional tax burden. Furman is correct to point out that this approach could reduce costs and to recommend that we leave it to market forces to determine the most efficient form of health insurance. As such, we could avoid our past errors in promoting health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or health savings accounts (HSAs) as the exclusive answer to all health policy problems. The result of these realigned incentives would be to increase the proportion of workers who are covered by more cost-effective policies with the potential to lower the cost of coverage for all. At least some of the smaller firms that do not now offer insurance would then have new options to offer less costly coverage. The result would be an increase in employer-group coverage, not a decrease. The effects of sixty years of tax policy are thoroughly woven into labor markets and health insurance design. If this open-ended tax policy has caused us to develop an inefficient form of health care delivery, then it seems logical that some sort of limit could start us on the path to a more cost-effective system. Reforms of the individual insurance market would help, but the greatest potential for improvement is in the employment sector, where three-fifths of our population now receives coverage.
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