H E A L T H  I N S U R A N C E : 
C O S T  S A V I N G S
W E B E X C L U S I V E

19 June 2002 

          

How Low Can You Go? The Impact Of Reduced Benefits And Increased Cost Sharing

The same level of cost savings achieved by cutting benefits or raising cost sharing could be achieved by switching to group-model HMO plans..

by Jason S. Lee and Laura Tollen

ABSTRACT:

Amid escalating health care costs and a managed care backlash, employers are considering traditional cost control methods from the pre–managed care era. We use an actuarial model to estimate the premium-reducing effects of two such methods: increasing employee cost sharing and reducing benefits. Starting from a baseline plan with rich benefits and low cost sharing, estimated premium savings as a result of eliminating five specific benefits were about 22 percent. The same level of savings was also achieved by increasing cost sharing from a $15 copayment with no deductible to 20 percent coinsurance and a $250 deductible. Further increases in cost sharing produced estimated savings of up to 50 percent. We discuss possible market- and individual-level effects of the proliferation of plans with high cost sharing and low benefits.

After nearly a decade of relief from annual double-digit growth in health care costs, the nation is again experiencing explosive price increases. Managed care is no longer perceived as the silver bullet it was in the early 1990s. The consumer backlash and some observers’ doubts about managed care’s ability to provide long-term cost savings, coupled with an economic recession, are fueling a new round of innovations by plans and purchasers. Such innovations include preferential use of cost-effective technologies and care, strategies to decrease medical errors and geographic variation in costs, chronic care management, multitier formularies, defined-contribution strategies, increased use of consumer information, and e-health technologies.

However, as employers confront today’s immediate economic pressures, such as an 11 percent health insurance premium increase in 2001 and predicted increases of 12.7 percent by the end of 2002, they are also turning to the older, more traditional strategies of moderate premium increases, increased cost sharing, and reduced benefits.¹ For example, with respect to retiree health benefits, the New York Times recently reported that “many large companies are increasing their forecasts of future health care liabilities because their current costs are rising more rapidly than they expected…Since accounting rules require companies to reflect their future health care liabilities as a reduction in current earnings…companies are trying to limit the damage to profits by demanding larger copayments, raising deductibles, and limiting coverage for retirees.”² In addition, several recent opinion surveys indicate that a majority of surveyed large employers plan to reduce benefits or increase cost sharing for their employees in the next year.³ There is growing concern in the health policy community about the effect that movement toward coverage with lower benefits and higher cost sharing could have on insurance markets in general and on the poor and chronically ill in particular.⁴

In this paper we estimate the impact of three “traditional” strategies used by employers to reduce their exposure to increasing health care costs: (1) paring down benefits by offering less generous coverage for specific services; (2) excluding benefits from coverage altogether; and (3) shifting financial liability to employees by increasing their cost-sharing responsibilities. We also compare the cost-saving potential of these strategies with the savings that may be achieved by switching to a group-model health maintenance organization (HMO), although we acknowledge that the availability of such products is limited.

The purpose of this paper is to provide data to inform public and private decisionmakers as they consider various means of controlling health care costs through benefit design. We use an actuarial model and several assumptions to quantify the premium-reduction effects of the three strategies noted above. This analysis will allow employers, consumers, policymakers, and other stakeholders to evaluate the savings available from traditional cost containment tools they have implemented or are considering. The analysis also should be useful to purchasers that hope to use these tools in combination with newer ones, such as defined-contribution and other strategies employed by “consumer-directed” health plans.⁵ Finally, this information will be of interest to state Medicaid officials as they contemplate using new federal flexibility to expand coverage by reducing benefits for certain categories of current recipients.⁶

Data And Methods

To estimate the premium-reducing effects of paring down and eliminating benefits, we compare the premium estimate for a “baseline” plan (with generous benefits and low enrollee cost sharing) with premium estimates for plans with pared-down and eliminated benefits. Then we estimate the premium-reducing effects of different cost-sharing variants. These estimates allow us to compare the relative impact of reducing benefits versus increasing cost sharing.

Our analysis focuses on the small-group market, where affordability and accessibility have long been major problems. In 2000 more than half (61.5 percent, or fourteen million) of uninsured workers in the country were employed by small firms (having one to ninety-nine employees).⁷ In addition, health insurance premiums have been rising more rapidly for small employers than for larger ones.⁸

Source of premium estimates. We estimated premiums using the Hay Group’s Mental Health Benefit Value Comparison (MHBVC) model, Version 2.0. The Hay Group, an actuarial firm, developed this and earlier Benefit Value Comparison (BVC) models for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH).⁹ The current version of the model is called the “Mental Health” BVC because it was last updated under an NIMH contract; however, it is a comprehensive pricing model that includes both mental and physical health services.

The MHBVC draws from four sources of medical claims data: (1) a study of insurance company experience performed by the Society of Actuaries for the CRS in the late 1980s; (2) a mid-1990s study by the Society of Actuaries on the characteristics and distribution of large claims; (3) a series of Hay Group studies performed for the NIMH in the late 1990s on the distribution and characteristics of mental health claims; and (4) annual Hay Group Benefits Reports (HBR), which are used to calibrate and update the model.¹⁰ The latest version is calibrated to the 2000 HBR.

Unadjusted, the MHBVC Version 2.0 reflects health care utilization and costs in indemnity plans in 2000. We used the 2001 HBR to update the model one year. Because our comparisons are among preferred provider organization (PPO) (rather than indemnity) plan designs, another modification of the model was necessary. To reflect the fact that PPOs negotiate discounts with preferred providers, we applied a management factor of 0.85 (a 15 percent discount) for in-network utilization.¹¹ We assumed no discount for out-of-network utilization. Drawing upon the experience of the Hay Group, we assumed that 70 percent of utilization would take place inside the network.

The MHBVC model is also adjusted to account for the fact that cost-sharing factors—coinsurance, deductibles, and out-of-pocket spending limits—influence demand for medical services. The relationship between cost sharing and demand for care is complex, but the direction of the relationship is known. Insured persons’ demand for medical services decreases as their share of the total cost increases. In other words, increased cost sharing reduces demand.¹² Available evidence suggests that the extent to which cost sharing reduces demand is not constant across benefits. We used the Hay Group’s default values of 30 percent reduced demand for hospital services, 100 percent for prescription drugs, and 70 percent for other medical services.¹³ The Hay Group based these values on its review of relevant literature, including the RAND Health Insurance Experiment.

When using the MHBVC to model premiums for the largest employers, the Hay Group adds 8 percent to total claims costs to account for administration and profit. To reflect the fact that the small-group market has higher administrative costs than the large-group market has, we increased this number to 30 percent of health care claims.¹⁴

A final model adjustment concerns the pharmacy benefit. As noted above, model updates are calibrated against an annual survey of employer benefits to keep pace with health care inflation. The same inflation factor is applied to all benefits. Yet pharmacy costs have increased more rapidly than other health care costs in recent years. A recent study found that the average annual per capita health care cost increase between 1999 and 2001 was 7.3 percent for all types of care, but 16.0 percent for pharmacy alone.¹⁵ Without an appropriate adjustment, the model would underestimate the portion of premium attributable to pharmacy costs. Therefore, we fixed pharmacy costs in the model at 10.8 percent of premium. We chose this figure based on a 2000 national study showing that pharmacy costs accounted for 10.8 percent of all spending on personal health care services by all U.S. payers.¹⁶ It is also consistent with anecdotal evidence obtained from two major carriers we contacted. When we increased pharmacy to account for 10.8 percent of premium, we decreased all other benefits accordingly, so the total premium, which had been calibrated using the 2001 HBR, remained the same.

The baseline plan. To estimate what happens to premiums when benefits are pared down or eliminated, we created a generous baseline plan covering all major benefits. Because this plan also has low levels of enrollee cost sharing, it serves as the baseline for the cost-sharing analysis as well. We also refer to the baseline plan as the “full-benefit plan with level 1 cost sharing.” The term “full-benefit” denotes that all major traditional benefits (preventive, primary, inpatient, home health, pharmacy, durable medical equipment, mental health, lab and x-ray, and so on) are covered at some level, in contrast to the plan we model that pares down selected services. “Level 1 cost sharing” denotes the relatively low level of copayment associated with the baseline plan, which we later contrast with higher levels of cost sharing (levels 2–9). We derived the baseline plan from an actual point-of-service (POS) plan that was sold in California’s small-group market by a major health plan in 2001.¹⁷

Although the baseline plan has a cost-sharing structure normally associated with HMOs ($15 office visit copayment and no in-network deductible), it is based on a broad provider network, more similar to a large PPO (as offered by a Blue Cross Blue Shield plan, for example) than to a group-model HMO (such as Kaiser Permanente).

Effect Of Paring Down Or Eliminating Benefits

We ran the full-benefit plan with level 1 cost sharing through the adjusted MHBVC and estimated a monthly premium of $274 for single coverage and $742 for family coverage. To estimate and compare the premium effects of paring down versus excluding benefits, we selected four benefit categories: pharmacy; durable medical equipment (DME); mental health and substance abuse care; and preventive, hearing, and vision care. We also modeled the premium effect of capping the annual dollar amount paid by the plan at $100,000, essentially paring down coverage of catastrophic claims.

Exhibit 1 describes the differences between the full-benefit and pared-down plans for each benefit we examined. We selected these benefits for two reasons. First, we hoped to configure pared-down plans in ways that might actually be found in the small-group market, either now or in the near future. For example, we thought it likely that an employer seeking to provide a moderate-price plan might reduce or eliminate coverage for DME or mental health care. Second, we wanted to “push the envelope” by creating plans that are not likely to be found in today’s markets, either because federal or state law prohibits them or because employers and employees would not buy them (for example, a plan that limits the insurer’s liability to $100,000 per year, essentially leaving enrollees to their own devices, or to the safety net, for catastrophic events).

Exhibit 2 shows the relative premium-reducing effects of paring down and excluding the four benefits described above, as well as all expenses over $100,000 in plan costs, holding cost sharing constant at level 1. The largest premium savings are attributable to paring down or excluding pharmacy benefits. Considered as a group, paring down all of these benefits produces a 13.9 percent reduction from the full-benefit premium, and excluding them results in a 21.5 percent reduction.¹⁸ In absolute terms, excluding benefits produced about 7.6 percentage points more in premium savings than paring them down.¹⁹

Effect Of Increasing Enrollee Cost Sharing

Our analysis takes into account three cost-sharing variables: coinsurance (the enrollee’s financial obligation expressed as a percentage of costs), annual deductible, and maximum annual out-of-pocket expenses. We start with the baseline plan and gradually increase enrollees’ cost-sharing responsibilities.

Exhibit 3 lists the cost-sharing levels we modeled, from the least cost sharing to the greatest. Coinsurance varies according to whether services are received in or out of the network. Deductibles and maximum out-of-pocket limits vary by whether care was received in or out of the network, and also by individual versus family coverage. We also consider whether a plan has a maximum out-of-pocket limit. If a plan does not, there is no limit on an enrollee’s financial risk. Because this reduces the insurer’s risk exposure, a plan without a maximum out-of-pocket limit is less expensive than an identical plan with such a limit.

The final column of Exhibit 3 shows the percentage premium reduction achieved by moving from level 1 to each successive cost-sharing level, averaged across the full-benefit and pared-down plans. For both plan types, the largest premium decline (approximately twenty-two percentage points) occurs between levels 1 and 2. Note the similarity between this estimate and the reduction estimated by eliminating benefits—about 21.5 percent (see Exhibit 2). At the extreme, the effect of supplanting level 1 with level 9 cost sharing is to reduce premium estimates for both full-benefit and pared-down plans by 54 percent. Note that the premium difference between the full-benefit and pared-down plans at each level of cost sharing is generally less than the premium difference observed within the plans when moving from one cost-sharing level to the next.

Whether a plan limits an enrollee’s financial liability by capping out-of-pocket spending is an important feature in plan design. Exhibit 3 presents out-of-pocket maximums for cost-sharing levels 1–6. We also estimated premiums at each of these cost-sharing levels with no out-of-pocket maximums. This enabled us to make a series of comparisons holding constant type of coverage (single or family), benefit level (full or pared down), coinsurance, and deductible, allowing these “matched pairs” of plans to vary only by whether or not they had an out-of-pocket maximum. The overall premium-reducing effect of having no out-of-pocket maximum (calculated across twenty-four combinations of plan types, coverage types, and cost-sharing variants) ranged from 5 percent to 32 percent, depending on coinsurance and deductible levels. The effect was the greatest at the higher cost-sharing levels.

Summary Of Findings

As employers seek protection from rising health care costs by reducing benefits or increasing enrollee cost sharing or both, what level of savings can they reasonably expect? Our analysis shows the following. (1) Estimated premium savings from eliminating specific benefit categories (preventive/hearing/vision care, durable medical equipment, mental health/substance abuse care, pharmacy, and all care exceeding $100,000 in plan costs) were greater than savings from paring down those benefits (21.5 percent versus 13.9 percent, respectively). (2) Starting from a baseline plan with full benefits and low enrollee cost sharing, a similar level of premium savings can be achieved by either eliminating major categories of coverage or modestly increasing enrollee cost sharing. Specifically, eliminating coverage for the five benefit categories together reduces premium by about 21.5 percent. Increasing cost sharing from a plan with $15 copays and no deductible to one with 20 percent coinsurance and a $250 deductible reduces premium by about 22 percent. (3) Further increases in cost sharing produce estimated savings that eclipse those available from eliminating benefits. Specifically, premium savings of nearly 44 percent could be achieved, without changing benefits offered, by replacing the level 1 cost-sharing structure ($15 copays and no deductible) with 30 percent coinsurance and a $1,000 deductible. Moreover, savings of more than 50 percent could be achieved by increasing cost sharing from level 1 to a plan with 50 percent coinsurance and a $2,000 deductible (in effect, a “catastrophic” plan). (4) Elimination of maximum out-of-pocket spending limits can reduce premiums by 5–32 percent, depending on the level of coinsurance and deductible.

We have shown that significant premium cost savings may be achieved by reducing benefits or increasing enrollee cost sharing. As a general proposition, there is nothing new in asserting the cost-saving properties of these strategies, but we have added quantitative estimates to the discussion at a time when employers are reevaluating their role as sponsors of health insurance and seeking ways to limit their financial liability. However, we caution readers against focusing solely on the results of the empirical analysis. These results should be considered in light of possible effects, positive and negative, of reducing benefits or shifting greater costs onto enrollees.

Discussion And Policy Implications

Although our analysis has focused on the small-group market, this discussion raises issues that are equally relevant in midsize- and large-group markets, where employees may be offered high cost sharing or low benefit plans or both.

Consumerism. A desired effect of offering plans with increased enrollee financial responsibility is that they will help to make enrollees smarter consumers of health care services. This is one of the primary marketing messages of many of the new “consumer-directed” e-health plans, such as Definity, Lumenos, and Vivius. Such plans are betting that once first-dollar coverage and low cost sharing are removed from the equation, informed enrollees will have an incentive to limit their own demand for health care. In the process, medical care cost inflation will be constrained, and employees will be more satisfied with their health benefits.²²

Consumer-based cost containment strategies are founded on the assumption that patients will make wiser health care choices when cost and quality information is more widely available. However, the technologies that are needed to support a consumer-driven market—standardized quality measurement, risk adjustment, and effective communication of health plan performance—are not yet advanced enough to enable such support.²³ Therefore, a potential downside to consumerism is that patients who are ill informed but empowered with choice may purchase less or lower-quality care and may pay more for it. In a recent commentary describing the new consumerism paradigm in health care, James Robinson noted that “consumers vary enormously in their financial, cognitive, and cultural preparedness to navigate the complex health care system. The new paradigm fits most comfortably the educated, assertive, and prosperous and least comfortably the impoverished, meek, and poorly educated.”²⁴

Consumerism will likely work better for the “impoverished, meek, and poorly educated” to the extent that the technologies upon which it depends are further developed. Additional safeguards may also be considered, such as lower coinsurance for preventive care, tax credits, and subsidies for low-income employees, who have less discretionary income to pay for higher medical costs.

Risk segmentation. A second effect of the increased prevalence of plans with high cost sharing or low benefits (or both) is that it may give rise to risk segmentation at both the employer and market levels. Although we did not simulate premium changes over time when employees choose between more and less comprehensive plans, it is likely that employees who expect to use large amounts of care would choose more comprehensive plans, while those who expect to use less care would choose less comprehensive plans. (Here, “more comprehensive” refers to plans with low cost sharing and full benefits; “less comprehensive” refers to plans with high cost sharing and reduced benefits.) Over time, this dynamic would produce ever larger differences between comprehensive and noncomprehensive plan premiums.

Risk segmentation is especially troublesome when different plan types are insured by different carriers, rather than by the same carrier. In the former case, no single carrier can minimize risk-based premium differences between plan types by cross-subsidizing the premium of the comprehensive plan with that of the less comprehensive plan. Risk segmentation also can occur at the market level, as employers make coverage choices on behalf of whole groups. We would expect that employers who know their employees to be healthy would choose low-premium, less comprehensive plans, thereby driving up premiums for employers choosing a more comprehensive plan. As noted earlier, we expect that premium differences between more and less comprehensive plans would increase as the entire market segments over time. The resulting premium spiral could lead to a market in which comprehensive coverage becomes largely unaffordable.

Cost shifting. A third effect is that less comprehensive plans would shift health care costs from employers to employees. Some will view this strategy as an employer effort to limit financial liability at the expense of workers and their families. Others will argue that employees already pay for employer premium contributions through forgone wages.²⁵ From the latter perspective, cost shifting may be seen as a wage-conserving strategy. Either way, less comprehensive employment-based health plans may carry affordable premium price tags, but covered workers who use large amounts of care may come to believe that they have traded premium savings for higher total out-of-pocket costs.

Possible health impact. Another possible effect of employers’ moving to less comprehensive plans is the potential health impact of reduced demand for medical services associated with higher cost sharing. While the RAND Health Insurance Experiment provided important insight into this issue, the findings are now nearly thirty years old. They do not reflect intervening demographic shifts or health trends (such as the aging of the baby boomers and the increase in the prevalence and cost of chronic illness), nor do they reflect major changes that have taken place in health care markets in the past thirty years (for example, the advent of managed care, direct-to-consumer drug advertising, increased use of the Internet, and explosive growth in medical technology).

Given these changes, we cannot use the RAND findings to predict with certainty the effects of increased cost sharing on health outcomes today. However, many studies (on preventive, pharmacy, emergency, diabetes, and other types of care) support the RAND finding that increased cost sharing reduces utilization.²⁶ The time is ripe for new research into the magnitude of this reduction and, ultimately, its impact on health outcomes.

Reconsidering the group-model HMO. Rather than (or perhaps, in addition to) increasing cost sharing or reducing benefits, employers may consider a third cost-control option: selection of a group-model HMO. This model has traditionally achieved savings by developing a narrow physician network with a homogeneous culture and practice style (among other cost-control tools), unlike the PPO networks of unaffiliated providers assumed in this study.

Analysis of an online insurance broker site, eHealthInsurance.com, allows premium comparisons among different types of carriers (traditional PPOs, group-model HMOs, and others). One example comes from the highly competitive Northern California market: For similar plan designs, group-model HMO premiums are 20–25 percent less than premiums for a PPO-style carrier. It is striking that the potential savings available from switching to a group-model HMO are similar to those demonstrated in this analysis when we eliminated benefits (21.5 percent) or increased cost sharing (22 percent).²⁷ It must be noted, however, that the availability of group-model HMOs is limited to a few geographic areas.

Our analysis quantifies the impact of increased cost sharing and of paring down and eliminating specific benefits. We found that increasing cost sharing can have a relatively large impact on premiums; paring down and eliminating specific benefits had a more limited impact. While not new to actuaries, this knowledge may become more significant to decisionmakers because of the confluence of two factors: the recent return to double-digit health care inflation, and the sustained backlash against managed care. Even without federal legislation, managed care’s cost-control techniques have been weakened.²⁸ Already seeing a trend, many analysts predict that more employers will turn to employee cost sharing or reduced benefits as the next most promising means to control health care costs.

However, shifting sizable financial risk to consumers on a broad scale could lead to another backlash, possibly larger than the one preceding it. What would happen next is pure speculation. Depending on the political and social environment, we could see a return to some aspects of managed care. Alternatively, health care could become (more) stratified if the wealthy can buy out of managed care constraints, while middle-class consumers resolve to view its cost-controlling devices as the best way to limit their financial risk.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Edwin Hustead and Sevim Kuyumcu of the Hay Group. Thanks are also due to John Bertko, Bob Crane, Anne Gauthier, Jamie Robinson, and our anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this paper. Finally, the authors thank Alain Enthoven for noting the need for such an analysis and providing guidance on the benefits to be examined. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., or the Permanente Medical Groups.

NOTES

1. Data from J. Gabel et al., “Job-Based Health Insurance in 2001: Inflation Hits Double Digits, Managed Care Retreats,” Health Affairs (Sep/Oct 2001): 180–186; and William M. Mercer Inc., “Health Benefit Cost Up 11.2 Percent in 2001—Highest Jump in 10 Years,” Press Release, 10 December 2001, www.mercerhr.com/press release/details.jhtml?idContent=1011125 (14 May 2002).
2. M. Freudenheim, “Companies Trim Health Benefits for Many Retirees as Costs Surge,” New York Times, 11 May 2002.
3. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Health Care Costs 2002—Watson Wyatt Worldwide Survey Results, October 2001, www.watsonwyatt.com/research/resrender.asp?id=ONL002&page=1 (14 May 2002); and Harris Interactive, “As Corporate Concerns about Health Care Costs Continue to Rise, Many Employers Plan to Shift More Costs to Their Employees,” Health Care News (9 October 2001).
4. For example, see S. Trude et al., “Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Pressing Problems, Incremental Changes,” Health Affairs (Jan/Feb 2002): 66–75.
5. For example, see P. Fronstin, Defined Contribution Health Benefits,EBRI Issue Brief no. 231 (Washington: Employee Benefit Research Institute, March 2001); and J.B. Christianson, S.T. Parente, and R. Taylor, “Defined-Contribution Health Insurance Products: Development and Prospects,” Health Affairs (Jan/Feb 2002): 49–64.
6. Utah recently received federal approval to expand Medicaid coverage to all adults with incomes under 150 percent of the federal poverty level by reducing benefits and adding cost sharing for certain current recipients. Newly covered adults will pay $50 per year for a benefit plan that covers primary and preventive care but does not include inpatient hospital care.
7. P. Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2001 Current Population Survey, EBRI Issue Brief no. 240 (Washington: EBRI, December 2001).
8. Gabel et al., “Job-Based Health Insurance in 2001.”
9. The Congressional Research Service has used BVC models to inform congressional debate on the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, tax credits for the uninsured, President Clinton’s Health Security Act, mental health parity, and other issues. The CRS has also used BVC models to provide premium estimates to the Congressional Budget Office.
10. The HBR is an annual survey of benefit programs and costs of more than 1,000 employers. It is representative of most sectors of the economy.
11. Recognizing that in some markets some carriers may obtain even deeper discounts, we chose 15 percent as a conservative estimate of average expected discounts across the country, based on the experience of the Hay Group.
12. J.P. Newhouse, Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
13. Consider, for example, an enrollee who faces the prospect of $100 in prescription drug costs. Under Hay’s demand reduction assumption, a $10 copay reduces the demand for prescription drugs by 100 percent of the copay, or $10, thus lowering the estimate for prescription drug costs to $90. The enrollee’s cost-sharing obligation would be applied to $90, and the insurer would pay the $80 balance. We note that in today’s markets, direct-to-consumer advertising for prescription drugs may have a countervailing influence on cost sharing’s demand reduction. As a result, the demand reduction factor of 100 percent for prescription drugs may be slightly high, but without empirical data to revise it, we relied on the Hay Group’s default value.
14. There is no generally agreed-upon estimate of administrative costs as a percentage of claims in small-group markets. We chose 30 percent based on the Hay Group’s experience, recognizing that the experience of carriers varies.
15. B. Strunk, P. Ginsburg, and J. Gabel, “Tracking Health Care Costs: Hospital Care Surpasses Drugs as Key Cost Driver,” www.healthaffairs.org (26 September 2001): W39–W50.
16. K. Levit et al., “Inflation Spurs Health Spending in 2000,” Health Affairs (Jan/Feb 2002): 172–181.
17. For a full description of the benefits and cost-sharing provisions of the baseline plan, contact Jason Lee at jlee{at}ahsrhp.org or Laura Tollen at laura.a.tollen{at}kp.org.
18. Although pharmacy benefits account for 10.8 percent of premium under the full-benefit plan, eliminating these benefits could lead to a premium reduction of less than 10.8 percent if increased use of other services offsets the effect of eliminating pharmacy coverage. However, without clear evidence to quantify such an offset, we were unable to model this effect. As a result, our estimates of total savings attributable to paring down and eliminating coverage of specific benefits may be somewhat overstated.
19. In the premium estimates for these lower-benefit plans, we held the administrative add-on constant at 30 percent of total claims. However, some administrative costs are fixed and will not be reduced in a linear manner as health care claims are reduced. As a result, administration as a percentage of claims may not be the same at all benefit levels. However, we do not expect that adjusting for this dynamic would materially change the results of this analysis.
20. For these plans, we assumed there would be no out-of-network use.
21. Here the premium estimate for the full-benefit plan differs from the $274 presented earlier because the latter estimate assumes an out-of-pocket spending limit, while this estimate does not.
22. Christianson et al., “Defined-Contribution Health Insurance Products.”
23. S. Silow-Carroll and L. Duchon, E-Health Options for Business: Evaluating the Choices, Pub. no. 508 (New York: Commonwealth Fund, March 2002).
24. J.C. Robinson, “The End of Managed Care,” Journal of the American Medical Association 285, no. 20 (2001): 2622–2628.
25. M.V. Pauly, Health Benefits at Work: An Economic and Political Analysis of Employment-Based Health Insurance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
26. G. Solanki, H.H. Schauffler, and L.S. Miller, “The Direct and Indirect Effects of Cost Sharing on the Use of Preventive Services,” Health Services Research 34, no. 6 (2000): 1331–1350; B. Motheral and K. Fairman, “Effect of a Three-Tier Prescription Copay on Pharmaceutical and Other Medical Utilization,” Medical Care 39, no. 12 (2001): 1293–1304; R. Johnson et al., “The Effect of Increased Prescription Drug Cost Sharing on Medical Care Utilization and Expenses of Elderly Health Maintenance Organization Members,” Medical Care 35, no. 11 (1997): 1119–1131; J.V. Selby, B.H. Fireman, and B.E. Swain, “Effect of Copayment on Use of the Emergency Department in a Health Maintenance Organizations,” New England Journal of Medicine 334, no. 10 (1996): 635–641; A.J. Karter et al., “Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose—Language and Financial Barriers in a Managed Care Population with Diabetes,” Diabetes Care 23, no. 4 (2001): 477–483; and M. Wong et al., “Effects of Cost Sharing on Care Seeking and Health Status: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study,” American Journal of Public Health 91, no. 11 (2001): 1889–1894.
27. This finding—that similar savings are available from either moving to a group-model HMO or increasing enrollee cost sharing—is consistent with the findings of the RAND experiment. See W.G. Manning et al., “A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a Prepaid Group Practice on Use of Services,” New England Journal of Medicine 310, no. 23 (1984): 1505–1510.)
28. Robinson, “The End of Managed Care”; and D.A. Draper et al., “The Changing Face of Managed Care,” Health Affairs (Jan/Feb 2002): 11–23.

Jason Lee is senior research manager at the Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy in Washington D.C. Laura Tollen is a senior policy consultant with the Kaiser Permanente Institute for Health Policy in Oakland, California.


©2002 Project HOPE–The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.